The Fall campaign of 1862 opened in early August as Union Armies under George
McClellan
undertook evacuation of the James River Peninsula after a series of bloody but inconclusive
battles with the Army of Northern Virginia under Robert E. Lee. McClellan intended to reunite
with the Union Army in Northern Virginia commanded by yours truly. His plan involved a swift
movement by water to Aquia Creek and then an overland march to capture Culpepper. This
would set the stage for an advance on Richmond from the north before winter set in. McClellan,
however, proved uniquely unable to gauge the value of intelligence he received from Pinkerton et
al. He consistently under-estimated Confederate strength and intentions in the Shenandoah Valley
and he consistently over-estimated enemy stength around Culpepper.
As "Little Napoleon" embarked and moved troops, my army engaged in a series of manuvers
intended to concentrate forces, protect the routes to Washington and position myself to link up
with McClellan. These objectives were not always congruent and it was exceedingly difficult to
accomplish all these while at the same time mollifying Washington politicians who feared for their
own hides and George McClellan who seemed to believe I should carry the war to conclusion
before he arrived. With hindsight it is now clear that I and my rebel counterpart danced around
each other, both missing grand opportunities to strike a heavy blow. It was at the small hamlet of
Sperryville that plans began to unravel (and a legend born). Union troops under my direct
command intercepted a Confederate blocking force outside the Valley. My troops fought a grand
action, battering the Confederate left. Just as my troops positioned themselves to turn the flank
and isolate the remaining brigades, volunter troops from Pennsylvania inexplicably lost heart when
they came under fire from the last remaing Confederate battery on the left. The Pennsylvanians
bolted from their positions triggering a general route by other troops in the line. My headquarters
was able to rally most of the men, but too late. The Confederates had reinforced their lines and my
men were spent.
This loss, I swiftly learned, opened the door for General Longstreet to move
several thousand Confederate troops into the Valley for a strike towards the key positions at
Front Royal and Harper's Ferry. My warnings to McClellan went unheeded too long as he
continued to disembark troops in Aquia Creek. These troops were too far from the Valley to have
any impact in the critical battles to follw. Furthermore, once the need to move these troops
overland quickly was finally realized, the operation severely taxed our rolling stock and created a
general logjam on the railroads. McClellan finnaly directed his remaining corps to disembark
farther north, in Baltimore, but the stage was set for disaster.
Longstreet's advance up the Valley was opposed by an inferior Union force. These troops
did
have the advantage of terrain, however, as Longstreet was confined to a relatively narrow front. A
fight for the bridges over the confluence on the North and South branches of the Shenandoah
outside of Front Royal held promise of a vital delay, but the Union commander on the scene relied
upon a plan that required his engineers destroy a stone bridge on his flank. When they failed to do
this Confederates overwhelmed the flank, rendering the Federal troops totally vulnerable. They
withdrew towards Harper's Ferry fighting a delaying action the whole way.
At Harper's Ferry
troops under Dixon Miles once again lost another opportunity. Miles deployed his few brigades to
resist the van of Longstreet's troops, and he deployed two full brigades in defilade in a wooded
area southeast of the road. The Confederates took the bait and forced the small stream crossings
the Federal troops had selected for their defensive lines. With a full division astride this natural
obstacle, Miles ordered his hidden reserve to strike and cut off half of the enemy troops. Miles,
however, had fallen prey to his vice and Union troops once again lost their nerve. Miles had been
drinking heavily throughout the fight, likely to assuage his fragile nerves. Thus emboldened, he set
out to lead the great attack, only to be struck from his mount by a Southern tree branch. The sight
of their leader suddenly and inexplicably prone once again set off a series of routes. By the time
the troops had been returned to good order, the opportunity was gone. The Confederates were
deployed in superior numbers. The Union withdrew, effectivley surrendering Harper's Ferry. With
these actions, the Union forces were permanently placed on the defensive.
In the next installment I will relate accounts of some of the greatest battles ever fought on
this
continent. I will also describe how George McClellan's mighty opinion of himself led him to
become the guest of Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, and I will recount my own struggles to
maintain control of a restive population in Virginia, or at least of one Soutern Belle. For now, I
must bid you adieu. The Sioux call for my attention.
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